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Abstract 
International trade growth in the last 50 years has generated huge profits. But it also has produced high levels of 
corruption among state agency officials and business people. Bribery, for example, has enriched the businesses that paid the 
bribes and the state agency officials who received them.  Corruption in some countries is so entrenched and widespread that it 
can be fairly characterized as a disease.  And this disease is spawned by a cumulus of factors such as poverty, lenient public 
perceptions about corruption, and weak or nonexistent strategies to eradicate corrupt practices. 
Romania is one of the countries suffering from this disease, and it badly needs a cure. Fighting endemic corruption 
is not easy, however. Yet, some countries are advancing in their efforts to eradicate corruption. The U.S., for instance, has 
achieved some success in dealing with bribery through its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Recently, the U.K. adopted a similar 
approach. Romania could learn from these examples. 
This paper analyzes Romania’s current criminal law anti-corruption framework and proposes a new framework 
based on the U.S. model.  This proposal also considers the U.K. Bribery Act in tailoring a framework that will work for 
Romania. 
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1. Introduction 
Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon that “distorts markets and competition, breeds cynicism among 
citizens, undermines the rule of law, damages government legitimacy, and corrodes the integrity of the private 
sector” (Heimann & Heimann, 2006, p.1). It takes different forms, including, at its extreme, state capture. And it 
is fuelled by an array of factors such as poverty, lack of education, lack of legislation, lax law enforcement, 
excessive bureaucracy, and a social mentality that accepts it or does not resist it. Corruption is widespread in 
Southeastern European countries, where a cumulus of these factors permits it to exist. Bribery is the most 
common manifestation of corruption, so common as to sometimes be part of everyday life, thus deterring in the 
long run economic growth and social progress.  
Due to its many forms and often well-entrenched causes, corruption is a huge problem to tackle. The 
fight against it is seemingly endless and invariably discouraging. However, legislative and enforcement actions in 
the last twenty years have shown that some countries are willing to combat corruption at the national and the 
international levels. As a result, anti-corruption legislation and strategies to implement it effectively are 
increasingly common today. Multiple-pronged strategies to fight corruption are focusing on transparency and 
accountability in political activities; transparency, accountability, and efficiency in public administration; sound 
business environments; and openness in society (Anderson et. al, 2001). And these efforts can and are producing 
rewards. For instance, a sound business environment - that is, one that is “bribery free”- can return gains in long-
term economic development to the benefit of both foreign businesses and their host country.      
Our paper considers two models available to Romanian legislators for creating a comprehensive and 
articulated body of law to criminalize bribing foreign officials: the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 
and the U.K. Bribery Act. It argues that Romania must bring its legislation and enforcement in step with these 
models and their implementation. 
2. Romania’s Situation 
International efforts to fight corruption in the international marketplace are concentrated in legislation 
such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions (“OECD Convention”), and the Council of Europe Criminal and Civil Law Convention on 
Corruption, coupled with national legislation such as the FCPA and most recently the U.K. Bribery Act. This 
legislation alone constitutes a major achievement in the fight against corruption. Its vigorous implementation 
would support even more optimism. Yet, the obstacles to success at the international and the national levels are 
many. At international level, for instance, the main obstacles are the high cost of detecting offenses, the lack of 
foreign cooperation and the difficulty of proving that a quid pro quo was promised or given for a bribe (Segal, 
2006). 
  
In Romania corruption is endemic and systemic. Transparency International reports a corruption 
perceptions index score of 44 for Romania where 0 means highly corrupt. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia received the 
same score.  The least corrupt country was Denmark, with a score of 90, and the most corrupt country was 
Somalia, with a score of 8 (Transparency International, 2012). Efforts to combat corruption in Romania have not 
been successful, even though the Romanian Criminal Code targets domestic corruption by criminalizing 
receiving a bribe, paying a bribe, trafficking in influence, and acceding to a conflict of interest. Also, Law no. 
78/2000 for the prevention, discovery and sanctioning corruption crimes and Law no. 176/2010 for integrity in 
exercising public functions fill some gaps elsewhere, widen the range of corruption offences and strengthen 
enforcement. At regional level, Romania is involved in different projects for joint action against corruption. 
However, Romania’s pressing need for economic progress and development requires more. It requires a sound 
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business environment. And this sound business environment could be achieved by implementing well-designed 
legislation addressing international corruption, namely, the corporate bribery of foreign officials. This is exactly 
one of the objectives of Romanian National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2012-2015.Taking the examples of the U.S. 
FCPA and the more recently-enacted U.K. Bribery Act, we believe that their core norms are imperative for a 
“corruption-free” business environment and, ultimately, for a healthy economic development in Romania. 
3. The U.S. Model  
The United States’ fight against corruption at the domestic and international levels is widely seen as a 
positive example. In response to the 1974 Watergate scandal, the U.S. has developed legislation targeting not 
only domestic corruption but also corruption by U.S. businesses abroad. Specifically, in 1977 Congress enacted 
the FCPA. This ground-breaking statute contains anti-bribery provisions and accounting provisions that target 
public corruption and fraud in the international marketplace. Congress has since amended the FCPA twice--in 
1988 and 1998, with the latter amendment occasioned by its ratification of the OECD anti-bribery convention. As 
a result, the FCPA is now broader than it was when it was first enacted (Greyson et al., 2009.). 
The FCPA's anti-bribery provisions prohibit corruptly offering, paying, promising or authorizing to pay 
money or anything of value to a foreign official in the exercise of his or her official duties to assist the payor in 
obtaining or retaining business or directing business to any person (15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1), 78dd-2(a)(1), 
78dd-3(a)). The definition of “foreign official” is broad, encompassing “any officer or employee of a foreign 
government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or 
any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or 
instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international organization” (15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1), 
78dd-2(h)(2), 78dd-3(f)(2)).  
Also prohibited are bribes of a political party, party official, or candidate for foreign political office. (15 
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a) (2), 78dd-2(a)(2), 78dd-3(a)(2)) And the FCPA prohibits indirect payments. Thus, third 
parties acting as intermediaries for foreign officials can be prosecuted if they know about the corrupt nature of 
the payments (15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3), 78dd-3(a)(3)).   
FCPA jurisdiction relies on both the nationality principle and the territoriality principle. Under the 
nationality principle, the FCPA covers U.S. nationals and companies organized under U.S. law.  These persons 
are liable under the FCPA wherever their prohibited conduct occurs (15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(g)).  
Corporations whose shares are traded on a U.S. stock exchange or that are registered with the U.S.  
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also are subject to FCPA jurisdiction.  Issuers can include foreign 
businesses, but for issuers not established under U.S. laws, territorial jurisdiction must be established.  The 
FCPA’s territorial jurisdiction makes foreign individuals and companies subject to the FCPA if they use the mails 
or other means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or if they act in furtherance of an improper inducement 
in U.S. territory (15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-3). 
In short, the FCPA’s reach is wide.  Persons and entities can be subject to the FCPA by their nationality, 
by their status as “issuers,” by acting on behalf of an issuer, by acting in furtherance of an improper inducement 
in U.S. territory, or by using a means, method, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce. 
The FCPA’s prohibitions only cover persons or entities who act wilfully, meaning voluntarily. These 
persons or entities also must have acted “corruptly”; that is, they must have known of the illicit nature of their 
behaviour. Although the FCPA does not define “corruptly”, the prevailing view is that “an act is [done] corruptly 
if done voluntarily [a]nd intentionally, and with a bad purpose of accomplishing either an unlawful end or result, 
or a lawful end or result by some unlawful method or means” (Tarun, 2006, p.4). Thus, violation of anti-bribery 
provisions is an intent crime.  
The “instrument of corruption” could be a payment, offer or promise of anything of value. The term 
“anything of value” is broad--it is defined as encompassing tangible and intangible goods that have an economic 
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value. The payment, offer or promise could be directly or indirectly made or authorized. In both cases, it does not 
matter if the bribed person rejects the payment, offer or promise; the FCPA is violated even if the bribe is 
refused.  
The instrument of corruption must be for one of these purposes: (1) influencing an official act or 
decision of the person; (2) inducing that person to do or omit to do any act in violation of his or her lawful duty; 
(3) inducing that person to use his or her influence with a foreign government to affect or influence any 
government act or decisions; or (4) securing any improper advantage. The fourth purpose is interpreted as 
meaning any advantage that the business would not otherwise have.   
In all cases, the conduct must be for “obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, 
any person.” This broad language ensures that this element is met if it can be demonstrated that the payment 
provides an unfair advantage for the payor that could range from tax reduction or writing off debts to preferential 
treatment (Tillipman, 2008). 
The statute establishes an exception and two affirmative defences. The exception covers “facilitating or 
expediting payments to secure performance of a routine governmental action by the recipient” (15 U.S.C. 
§§78dd-1(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1), 78dd-3(c)(1)). This exception is narrow. The FCPA defines payments for “routine 
governmental action” as including payments to obtain permits, licenses, or other official documents and to 
receive services such as visas, work orders, police protection, mail, telephone, utilities, cargo handling, and the 
protection of perishable products. But these so-called “grease” payments cannot be used to obtain new business 
or to continue business with a particular party.  Thus, companies are advised to be very careful when relying on 
this exception. 
The same advice applies to the FCPA’s affirmative defences: payments expressly permitted by the 
written laws of the host country and “reasonable and bona fide expenditures, directly related to the promotion, 
demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or the execution or performance of a contract with a 
foreign government or agency” (15 U.S.C. §§78dd-1(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2), 78dd-3(c)(2)). The U.S. Justice 
Department has published guidance documents on these defences.   
The FCPA also governs accounting and recordkeeping practices that apply to issuers of publicly traded 
securities. An issuer, whether domestic or foreign, must “make and keep books, records, and accounts which, in 
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the [company’s] assets” (15 
U.S.C. §§ 78m). These provisions prevent companies from concealing bribes by omitting such transactions in 
their accounting books.  
The FCPA provides for criminal and civil penalties that are variously enforced by the SEC and the 
Department of Justice. Criminal violations of the anti-bribery provisions may result in a fine up to $2 million per 
violation for an entity. An individual can face up to five years in prison, a fine of up to $100,000, or both, per 
violation. Also, any profits gained can be forfeited.  
Criminal violations of the accounting and record-keeping provisions can led to maximum sentences for 
individuals of up to 20 years in prison, fines up to $5 million, or both.  Entities can be assessed fines of up to $25 
million. Civil enforcement of the anti-bribery and accounting and record-keeping provisions against issuers and 
individuals acting on their behalf can lead to a penalty of up to $10,000. 
Between 2006 and 2010, FCPA prosecutions totalled 162, a higher number than all of the FCPA 
prosecutions from 1977 through 2005 (Warin, Falconer & Diamant, 2010). The most productive year for FCPA 
investigations was 2010. Well-known companies were investigated, such as ABB Ltd., Accenture Ltd., Alcatel 
Lucent, Alltel, Aon, Avon Products, Bridgestone, Bristol Myers Squibb Co., Chiquita Brands International, 
Daimler AG, Eli Lilly & Co, Johnson & Johnson, Maxwell Technologies, Morgan Stanley, Petro-Canada, Sun 
Microsystems, United Parcel Service, United Defence Industries and Xerox (Urofsky Ph. et al., 2010). As of the 
end of 2011, the German company Siemens had paid the largest penalty, $800 million, which it paid in 2008. 
As a result of the growing number of prosecutions, many MNCs developed their own anti-bribery 
systems that follow the guidance given by international and national law. Transparency International recently 
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released the Assurance Framework for Corporate Anti-Bribery Programmes. “The Framework is an independent 
assurance tool to be used by private sector companies to lend credibility to their anti-bribery systems. It requires 
public reporting aimed at increasing stakeholder confidence and creates benchmarks for companies to measure 
their improvement” (“Transparency International Releases”, 2012, p.3). Also, in November 2012, the DOJ and 
the SEC released a much-anticipated Resource Guide that details FCPA compliance and enforcement issues from 
those agencies’ perspectives. 
The success of such strong anti-bribery measures is demonstrable. Yet, the FCPA has been criticized for 
being too intrusive and for not leaving the fight against corruption to the market to wage (Surjadinata, 1998). 
Others argue that the FCPA’s focus on the sole-actor paradigm and needs to be broadened to attack significant 
sources of corruption--the foreign corrupt officials themselves. However, because of state sovereignty, U.S. 
prosecutors cannot prosecute corrupt foreign officials for simply accepting a bride; this must be left for local 
prosecutors. On the other hand, statues like the FCPA can and should be used in tandem with a vigorous fight 
against domestic corruption that reach beyond bribery to money laundering and asset recovery (Puckett, 2010). 
4. The U.K. Model  
As a member of OECD, the United Kingdom was strongly criticized for its unwillingness to adopt 
modern anti-bribery legislation to combat bribery of foreign public officials. British legislation needed a much 
awaited upgrade on this matter since Victorian times when the British anti-bribery legislation was first enacted. 
Stung by this criticism, the United Kingdom enacted the Bribery Act of 2011, which created a framework similar 
to the FCPA and accords with the provisions of OECD's anti-bribery convention that was ratified by the U.K. in 
1998. 
The U.K. Bribery Act details four separate offences: paying bribes (Section 1); receiving bribes (Section 
2); bribing a foreign public official (section 6); and failing as a commercial organization to prevent bribery 
(Section 7). Thus, unlike the FCPA, in its first two sections the U.K. Bribery Act combines the fight against 
domestic and international corruption, following the urgings of the U.N. and the OECD conventions. Section 6 
addresses bribing foreign officials by prohibiting the offering, promising or giving a financial or other advantage 
to a foreign public official with the intention of influencing the official in the performance of his or her official 
functions and thereby intending to obtain or to retain business or a business advantage. However, the offence is 
not committed where the official is permitted or required by applicable written law to be influenced by the 
advantage (U.K. Ministry of Justice, 2011).  
The U.K. Bribery Act contains one exception—where payments are permitted or required by the local 
written law—but, unlike the FCPA, no affirmative defence for reasonable and bona fide business courtesy 
expenses. However, the U.K. Ministry of Justice has admitted that the prosecution will have to establish for every 
case if there is a connection between this type of expenses and obtaining or retaining business or a business 
advantage (Warin, Falconer & Diamant, 2010). 
Section 7 of the U.K. Bribery Act is unique in the sense that it punishes the failure of a commercial 
organization to prevent bribery. By its broad language, Section 7 stretches the law even more than FCPA, which 
contains no such provision. However, there are voices saying that the FCPA’s accounting provisions have a 
similar effect as Section 7 because they force companies to establish efficient internal controls (Warin, Falconer 
& Diamant, 2010). Unlike the FCPA, the U.K. Bribery Act does not contain accounting provisions. However, the 
U.K. Company Act of 2006 separately addresses that issue. Also, the Bribery Act does not contain civil penalties, 
only criminal ones as provided by Section 11. 
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5. Conclusions  
Overall, we can say that both U.S. and U.K. laws are similar in purpose, text, and implications at 
international level. Considering the similarities between the laws enacted by these two economic powers and the 
fact that they have widespread companies operating internationally, progress can be made.   
Indeed, the U.S. is a leader in combating international corruption. The U.K. now has followed the U.S. 
with legislation that largely mirrors the FCPA and the UN and the OECD international legislation. Other 
countries are slowly moving towards the creation and adoption of anti-bribery legislation. Still, individual efforts 
will not succeed in annihilating domestic and international corruption. Similar legislation elsewhere and 
cooperation in enforcement remain key elements for successfully freeing companies the competitive pressure to 
bribe. Romania has to join international efforts in addressing international corporate corruption if it wants to have 
a sound business environment that will attract investors and will sustain long-term economic development.   
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